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I. INTRODUCTION
HE past Survey year was one of incremental change in the health-
law arena. As usual in odd-numbered years, the most significant
changes in law came out of the Texas legislature, although the
agencies and Texas Supreme Court made their own notable contribu-
tions, particularly with respect to telemedicine, hospital districts' liability
for indigent health care, and the use of physician extenders.
Brief mention should be made of changes in law that did not occur in
2009. Two competing versions of bills to amend the so-called "futility
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provision" of the Texas Advance Directives Act'-one to address numer-
ous suggestions for making the law more "family-friendly" and more pro-
cedurally balanced, 2 the other to eviscerate the futility provision
altogether 3-both died without getting a floor vote. The result thus re-
sembled a similar standoff in the 2007 legislative session, and there may
very well be a replay, with an uncertain outcome, when the 82nd Legisla-
ture is gaveled to a close in 2011.
II. PHYSICIANS
A. SUPERVISION AND DELEGATION
Cost-conscious states and private health plans are increasingly looking
to "physician extenders" to provide health care services to patients
through less-expensive providers, including physician assistants and nurse
practitioners. During the past year, the legislature and the Texas Health
and Human Services Commission (THHSC) wrestled with some of the
implications of this development, which shows no signs of slowing down.
Effective August 5, 2009, the THHSC adopted a new regulation and
amended an existing regulation pertaining to "Authorized Physician Ser-
vices" in connection with the state Medicaid program.4 The new regula-
tion differentiates "direct supervision," which requires the supervising
physician to be in the same office, building, or facility and immediately
available to help, and "personal supervision," which requires the super-
vising physician's physical presence.5 Also in that section, THHSC clari-
fied "when a supervising physician may bill Medicaid for services
provided by resident physicians in the context of a [graduate medical edu-
cation] program and services provided by other professionals." 6 Specifi-
cally, the regulation clarifies that services provided by a physician
assistant or advanced practice nurse are also "covered services" under the
chapter.7 Also, "covered physician services" include services performed
by the physician, medical acts delegated by the physician to persons
under the physician's supervision, and services performed by other physi-
cians in relation to a graduate medical education program.8
Senate Bill 381, effective September 1, 2009, adds to the Occupations
Code section 157.101(b-1), relating to the authority of physicians to dele-
gate to certain pharmacists the implementation and modification of a pa-
tient's drug therapy. 9 Physicians can delegate to pharmacists if (1) the
delegation follows a diagnosis, patient assessment, and drug therapy or-
1. TEX. HEALTH & SAFETY CODE ANN. § 166.046 (Vemon 2010).
2. Tex. H.B. 2964, 81st Leg., R.S. (2009).
3. Tex. H.B. 3325, 81st Leg., R.S. (2009).
4. See 34 Tex. Reg. 5059 (2009); see also 1 TEX. ADMIN. CODE §§ 354.1060-1062
(2009).
5. 1 TEX. ADMIN. CODE § 354.1060.
6. 34 Tex. Reg. 5059.
7. 1 TEX. ADMIN. CODE § 354.1062(d).
8. Id. § 354.1062(b), (c).
9. Tex. S.B. 381, 81st Leg., R.S. (2009).
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der, (2) the pharmacist practices in the hospital, hospital clinic, or institu-
tion, (3) the hospital has bylaws that allow such, (4) the pharmacist
provides his or her contact information and the physician's contact infor-
mation on each prescription signed by the pharmacist, and (5) the phar-
macist provides the protocol to the Texas State Board of Pharmacy.10
The board must list on its website a list of pharmacists who are authorized
to sign prescription drug orders under this section and their delegating
physicians."
Senate Bill 532, effective September 1, 2009, amends Occupations Pas
Code section 157.0511, regarding a physician's delegation of prescriptive
authority to physician assistants (PA) or advanced practice nurses
(APNs).12 The board must adopt rules that require a delegating physi-
cian to register the name and license number of the PA or APN to whom
the physician delegates.13 Section 157.053(a) is amended to include in the
definition of primary practice site a location where the PA or APN prac-
tices on-site with the delegating physician more than fifty percent of the
time and provides health care services for established patients, charity
health care services, or emergency relief services.14 Section 157.0541 is
amended to provide that physician supervision is adequate for the section
if the delegating physician is on-site with the APN or PA for ten percent
of the hours of operation of the site each month, the delegating physician
reviews ten percent of the medical charts for each APN and PA at the
site, and the delegating physician is available for assistance or consulta-
tion.15 A physician may delegate to no more than four PAs or APNs.16 If
the board determines that the types of services provided by PAs and
APNs are limited in nature and duration, then the board can modify or
waive (1) the limitation on the number of PAs and APNs, up to six PAs or
APNs, (2) the mileage limitation, or (3) the on-site supervision
requirements.' 7
B. PHYSICIAN RANKINGS
House Bill 1888, effective September 1, 2009, adds to the Insurance
Code chapter 1460, pertaining to standards required regarding certain
physician rankings by health benefit plans.18 Under chapter 1460, a health
plan issuer cannot rank physicians, sort physicians into "tiers," or publish
any ranking or tiered information unless (1) the standards used are na-
tionally recognized standards and guidelines adopted by the Insurance
Commissioner, (2) the standards are disclosed to each affected physician,
10. Id.
11. Id.






18. Tex. H.B. 1888, 81st Leg., R.S. (2009).
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and (3) each physician has an opportunity to dispute the ranking at least
forty-five days before publication.19 The statute provides specific proce-
dures which ensure due process for a physician who wishes to challenge
the rankings. 20 However, a physician cannot request or require patients
to agree not to rank or participate in surveys regarding the physician. 21
In developing the standards, the health plan issuer must ensure that phy-
sicians are actively involved in the development of standards and that the
measures and methodology used in the ranking system are valid and
transparent.22
C. PHYSICIAN MEDICAL BOARD PROFILE
House Bill 732, effective September 1, 2009, adds to the Occupations
Code section 154.006(k), relating to the removal of information from a
physician's medical board profile.23 The board must remove any record
of formal complaint required under section 154.006(b)(15) or (i) if the
complaint was dismissed five years prior as baseless, unfounded, or not
supported by sufficient evidence or if no action was taken against the
physician's license.24 Also, any record of investigation of medical mal-
practice claims must be removed if the investigation was resolved more
than five years prior and if no action was taken against the physician's
license.25
D. COVENANTS NOT TO COMPETE
Section 15.50 of the Texas Business & Commerce Code narrows the
terms under which a covenant not to compete will be enforceable against
a physician, in contrast to the usual rule that such covenants are enforcea-
ble as long as they are not naked restraints of trade and are reasonable as
to geographical scope, duration, and scope of covered activities. 26 House
Bill 3623, effective September 1, 2009, amends section 15.50 to clarify that
a covenant not to compete must relate to the practice of medicine in or-
der to qualify for the special limitations in section 15.50.27 Also, section
15.50(c) is added to clarify that the enforceability of a covenant not to
compete "does not apply to a physician's business ownership interest in a





23. Tex. H.B. 732, 81st Leg., R.S. (2009).
24. Id.
25. Id.






A. CLINICAL TRIALS AND COVERAGE
Senate Bill 39, effective September 1, 2009, adds to the Insurance Code
chapter 1379, regarding coverage for routine patient care costs for enroll-
ees who participate in certain clinical trials.29 Section 1379.052 requires
health benefit plans to provide benefits for routine patient care costs for a
federally approved clinical trial "conducted in relation to the prevention,
detection, or treatment of a life-threatening disease or condition."30
Chapter 1379 applies only to health benefit plans that provide medical or
surgical benefits incurred from a health condition, accident, or sickness.31
This chapter explicitly applies to the state Medicaid program and man-
aged care organizations contracting with THHSC to provide health care
services to Medicaid recipients.32 Under section 1379.051, the routine
costs in connection with clinical trials covered by this chapter are "costs
of any medically necessary health care service for which benefits are pro-
vided under a health benefit plan."33 Investigational new drugs and de-
vices, non-health-care services, and services specifically excluded from
coverage are not routine costs. 3 4 However, a research institution is not
entitled to reimbursement for routine patient care costs in a clinical trial
unless the institution agrees to accept reimbursement at the established
rates as payment in full for the patient care.35 This new law brings Texas
in line with twenty-three other states by obviating the choice faced by
many patients with life-threatening illnesses who can enroll in a clinical
trial that may provide the only chance for a cure but only by risking the
loss of insurance coverage for routine health care expenses.
B. ADVANCE DIRECTIVES
In the first amendment to the Advance Directives Act since 2003, the
legislature passed House Bill 2585, effective September 1, 2009, which
allows digital or electronic signatures and witness signatures on advance
directives. 36 Section 166.011 of the Health and Safety Code allows the
digital or electronic signature of an advance directive (including a direc-
tive to physicians, medical power of attorney, and out-of-hospital do-not-
resuscitate (OOH-DNR) order) by a declarant, witness, or notary, as well
as the revocation of a directive. 37 Digital signature is an electronic identi-
fier intended by the user to have the effect of a manual signature, and
requirements for a digital signature are provided by section 166.011(1).38












An electronic signature is a "facsimile, scan, uploaded image, computer-
generated image, or other electronic representation of a manual signa-
ture" that is intended by the user to have the effect of a manual signature,
and requirements for an electronic signature are provided by section
166.011(2).39
Additionally, section 166.032 provides that a declarant may sign a di-
rective and have the signature acknowledged before a notary instead of
signing before witnesses.40 Similarly, section 166.082(b) allows a declar-
ant to sign an OOH-DNR order and have the signature acknowledged
before a notary instead of signing the DNR order before witnesses. 41 Fi-
nally, a medical power of attorney may be signed by the principal and the
signature acknowledged by a notary without the presence of witnesses.42
If the principal is unable to physically sign the medical power of attorney,
another person may sign the medical power of attorney in the principal's
presence and at the principal's direction using a digital or electronic sig-
nature under section 166.154(c). 43
C. PROTECTED PATIENT INFORMATION
House Bill 2004, effective September 1, 2009, amends Business and
Commerce Code section 521.002(a)(2), regarding protection of "sensitive
personal information." 4 4 The definition of "sensitive personal informa-
tion" was amended to include identifying information relating to "[1] the
physical or mental health or condition of the individual; [2] the provision
of health care to the individual; or [3] payment for the provision of health
care to the individual."45 Section 2054.1125 of the Government Code was
added to require that a state agency that owns or maintains data including
sensitive personal information must comply with the notification require-
ments of Business and Commerce Code section 521.053 in the event of a
breach of security.46 Local governments are subject to the same require-
ment pursuant to section 205.010 of the Local Government Code.47 Fi-
nally, Health and Safety Code section 181.006 was added to provide that
for a non-governmental covered entity, protected health information in-
cludes any information that a person received health care from the cov-
ered entity. 48 That information is not public information.49
House Bill 4029, effective September 1, 2009, amends Health and














care information.50 Health care information now includes payment infor-
mation, and a hospital cannot release payment information without pa-
tient authorization.51 Also, under this section, the hospital can charge a
fee for requested records provided to the patient or the patient's legally
authorized agent by digital or electronic medium. 52
D. PRESCRIPTIONS, DRUGS, AND TESTING
The Texas Medical Board issued an emergency amendment to its disci-
plinary guidelines, creating an exception to the general rule that a physi-
cian may prescribe drugs only to a patient with whom the doctor has a
professional relationship.53 Beginning April 4, 2009, the general rule did
not preclude a physician's prescribing drugs to a partner of a patient who
may have a sexually transmitted disease. 54 Thus, the physician could pre-
scribe drugs to a non-patient in this limited circumstance. The emergency
rule was made permanent as of June 24, 2009.55
House Bill 1924, effective September 1, 2009, adds to the Occupations
Code section 562.1011, which permits a nurse or practitioner in a rural
hospital to withdraw a drug from a hospital pharmacy if there is no hospi-
tal pharmacist on duty or the pharmacy is closed and the drugs have been
ordered by a practitioner.56 Within seven days of such withdrawal, the
hospital pharmacist must verify and review the withdrawal.57 Further-
more, a pharmacy technician in a rural hospital may, without direct su-
pervision, enter medication orders into the data system, prepare,
package, and label prescription drugs, fill a medication cart, distribute
routine orders to patient care areas, and access and restock automated
medication supply cabinets.58 The pharmacy technician must be regis-
tered, and a pharmacist must be accessible at all times to respond to the
pharmacy technician's questions. 59 The pharmacist-in-charge in a rural
hospital must also develop and implement policies for pharmacy opera-
tion when no pharmacist is on-site, and rural hospitals can establish
standing protocols to include additional exceptions for when prospective
drug use is necessary. 60 Finally, section 568.008 permits a Class C phar-
macy with an ongoing clinical pharmacy program to allow a pharmacy
technician to verify another pharmacy technician's work relating to cer-
tain tasks if the patient orders have been reviewed previously by a phar-
50. Tex. H.B. 4029, 81st Leg., R.S. (2009).
51. Id.
52. Id.
53. 34 Tex. Reg. 2067 (2009); see also 22 TEx. ADMIN. CODE § 190.8 (2009).
54. 34 Tex. Reg. 2067 ("establishing a professional relationship is not required for a
physician to prescribe medications for sexually transmitted diseases for partners of the
physician's established patient, if the physician determines that the patient may have been
infected with a sexually transmitted disease").
55. 34 Tex. Reg. 4124.







macist.61 Such peer review is to be conducted in accordance with policies
adopted by the pharmacist-in-charge and rules adopted by the board.62
Senate Bill 904, effective May 26, 2009, adds Health and Safety Code
section 481.074(d-1) to provide that a practitioner may give multiple pre-
scriptions for a patient to receive up to a ninety-day supply of Schedule II
controlled substances if four requirements are met. 6 3 First, each prescrip-
tion must be issued for a legitimate medical purpose. 64 Second, the pre-
scribing practitioner must provide written instructions that each
prescription is to be filled at a later date.65 Third, the practitioner must
conclude that providing multiple prescriptions to the patient does not cre-
ate an undue risk of abuse. 66 Finally, the prescriptions must comply with
other state and federal laws.6 7
House Bill 1672, effective September 1, 2009, adds Health and Safety
Code section 33.0021, relating to newborn screening.68 Section 33.0021
requires that the Texas Department of Health (the Department) include
sickle-cell trait detection in the screening for heritable diseases and new-
born screening. 69 Section 33.0111 requires that the Department develop
a statement to clearly disclose to the parent or guardian of a newborn
child (1) that the Department can retain genetic material used to conduct
the newborn screening test, and how the material will be used, and (2)
that the parent or guardian can limit the use of genetic material by pro-
viding a written statement to such effect. 70 This disclosure statement
must be included on paperwork that informs the parents about the
screening, must be on a separate sheet, and must be presented with a
statement that allows the parent to limit the use of the genetic material.7'
The physician attending the newborn must present the disclosure state-
ment to the parents when the newborn is subjected to the screening, and
the Department must develop procedures to provide verification to the
Department that the parents were provided with the statement.72 Under
section 33.0112, the parent or guardian may file a written statement with
the Department prohibiting the retention and use of the genetic material,
and the department must destroy the genetic material within sixty days of
receiving the statement. 73 Furthermore, all records relating to this chap-
ter are confidential and not subject to subpoena except under limited cir-
cumstances, such as with client consent or by court order.74 However, if
61. Id.
62. Id.














the child or family is not identified, disclosure for statistical purposes or
quality assurance purposes is permitted.75
House Bill 1795, effective September 1, 2009, is entitled "Greyson's
Law" and amends Health and Safety Code section 33.011(a-1), relating to
newborn screening by requiring the Department of Health to add at least
twenty disorders to the list of required newborn screening tests.7 6 Section
33.017 creates a Newborn Screening Advisory Committee, which consists
of members appointed by the state health services commissioner and
must include health care providers, a hospital representative, persons
with family members affected by a condition for which newborn screen-
ing is required, and persons involved in the delivery of newborn ser-
vices.77 Also, section 81.090 is amended to provide that a physician
attending a pregnant woman must test the woman in her third trimester
for HIV infection and must retain reports of each case for nine months.78
Similarly, a physician present at a delivery shall test the woman on admis-
sion for delivery for syphilis and hepatitis B, and if the physician discov-
ers that the woman has not been tested for HIV, the physician must
expeditiously test her for HIV infection.79 If a physician present at deliv-
ery does not find in the woman's records a test for HIV infection, and
such test was not performed prior to delivery, the physician should test
the newborn child for HIV infection less than two hours after birth.80
However, a physician may not conduct any of the aforementioned tests if
the woman or the newborn child's parent or guardian objects to the
test.81
IV. HEALTH CARE LIABILITY CLAIMS
Marks v. St. Luke's Episcopal Hospital82 is one of the many medical-
liability cases filed before the 2003 medical-malpractice reform statute
became effective. The issue in Marks-the meaning of "health care lia-
bility claim" as found in the Medical Liability and Insurance Improve-
ment Act (MLIIA)83 -remains significant for hundreds of cases
governed by the MLIIA rather than the 2003 reform statute.
In Marks, the Texas Supreme Court distinguished a premises-liability
claim from a claim of medical negligence and held that only the latter was
a health-care liability claim under the MLIIA. While recovering from
back surgery at St. Luke's Hospital, Irving Marks fell and injured himself
75. Id.






82. No. 07-0783, 2009 WL 2667801 (Tex. Aug. 28, 2009).
83. Id. at *1. The MLIIA, TEX. REV. CIV. STAT. ANN. art. 4950i (Vernon 1977), was
repealed on September 1, 2003, and replaced by TEX. CIv. PRAc. & REM. CODE ANN.
§ 74.301-.303 Marks, 2009 WL 2667801, at *1 n.2.
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while attempting to stand using his hospital bed footboard.84 Marks sued
St. Luke's for negligence, alleging failure to train and supervise staff
properly, failure to provide him living assistance, failure to provide a safe
environment, and providing a negligently assembled and maintained hos-
pital bed.8 5 The trial court characterized Marks's claim as a health care
liability claim under the MLIIA and granted St. Luke's motion to dismiss
in light of Marks's failure to file a timely expert report as required by the
statute.86 The court of appeals originally concluded that Marks did not
assert a health care liability claim, but on remand from the Texas Su-
preme Court, the court of appeals affirmed the trial court decision.87
The Texas Supreme Court held that Marks asserted both a health-care
liability claim, which was subject to the requirements of the MLIIA, and
a premises-liability claim, which was not subject to the Act's require-
ments.88 To begin its analysis, the supreme court looked to the language
of the MLIIA:
The Act defines a "health care liability claim" as "a cause of action
against a health care provider or physician for treatment, lack of
treatment, or other claimed departure from accepted standards of
medical care or health care or safety" proximately resulting in a pa-
tient's injury or death. The Act does not define safety.89
To avoid a characterization of his claim as a health care liability
claim, Marks argued that "safety" should be construed to include
only patient care and treatment safety. 90 St. Luke's countered that
"safety" includes any unsafe condition in a health care facility.91
The supreme court then looked to the legislative intent behind the
MLIIA and concluded that the legislature's primary intent was to curb
the medical malpractice crisis.92 Since medical malpractice insurance
does not typically cover premises-liability claims, the supreme court was
forced to determine if Marks's claim could be distinguished from the ren-
dition of medical services. 93 To this end, the supreme court listed three
factors it considered: "(1) whether the specialized knowledge of a medical
expert may be necessary to prove the claim, (2) whether a specialized
standard in the health care community applies to the alleged circum-
stances, and (3) whether the negligent act involves medical judgment re-
lated to the patient's care or treatment." 94
84. Id. at *1
85. Id.
86. Id.
87. Id. at *1-2.
88. Id. at *10.
89. Id. at *2 (quoting TEX. REV. CIv. STAT. ANN. art. 4950i (Vernon 1977)).
90. Id. at *3.
91. Id.
92. Id.




The supreme court first examined Marks's claims of negligent patient
supervision and staff training. Finding these claims similar to claims
made by a nursing home resident, which the supreme court held to be
health care liability claims in Diversicare General Partner, Inc. v. Rubio,95
the supreme court concluded that Marks' training and supervision claims
were health care liability claims under the MLIIA.9 6 As to Marks's claim
that St. Luke's negligently assembled and maintained the hospital bed,
the key question was whether the unsafe bed was separable from the ren-
dition of medical or health care services, or alternatively, whether the
assembly and maintenance of the hospital bed required medical judg-
ment.97 Since there was no evidence that the bed's assembly or mainte-
nance required medical judgment (unlike special treatment beds or
medical restraints), the supreme court held that the bed was "merely inci-
dental to the patient's care" and that the MLIIA was not implicated.98
Thus, Marks pled both a health-care liability claim under the MLIIA and
an ordinary negligence claim. The supreme court affirmed in part, re-
versed in part, and remanded to the trial court for further proceedings.99
It is difficult not to agree with the four dissenting justices that the ma-
jority's opinion encourages artful pleading to get around the various limi-
tations and requirements that apply to health-care liability claims under
the MLIIA but not to ordinary negligence claims (such as premises
liability).1oo
In Hernandez v. Ebrom,'0 the Texas Supreme Court held that a health
care provider's failure to file an interlocutory appeal challenging the ade-
quacy of a plaintiff's expert report does not preclude challenging the re-
port on appeal.102 Doctor Hernandez of the McAllen Bone and Joint
Clinic performed knee surgery on Julious Ebrom.103 Ebrom filed a
health care liability suit for complications from the surgery against Her-
nandez and the Clinic.104 As required by the Civil Practice and Remedies
Code, Ebrom timely filed an expert report, and both defendants alleged
that the report was deficient and filed motions to dismiss, seeking attor-
ney's fees and costs.' 0 5 The trial court denied the motion as to Hernandez
but granted it as to the clinic.106 Before trial, Ebrom nonsuited Her-
nandez, and the trial court dismissed the case. 107 Hernandez appealed
the denial of his motion to dismiss, seeking his attorney's fees.108 The
95. 185 S.W.3d 842 (Tex. 2005).
96. Marks, 2009 WL 2667801, at *5.
97. Id. at *5-6.
98. Id. at *6-7.
99. Id. at *10.
100. See id. at *15 (Johnson, J., dissenting).
101. 289 S.W.3d 316 (Tex. 2009).









court of appeals dismissed Hernandez's claim for lack of jurisdiction, be-
cause the nonsuit rendered the order denying his motion to dismiss
moot.109 On appeal to the supreme court, Ebrom argued that because
Hernandez did not pursue an interlocutory appeal challenging the ade-
quacy of his expert report permitted by section 51.014(a)(9) of the Texas
Civil Practice and Remedies Code, Hernandez waived his complaint.110
The Texas Supreme Court agreed with Hernandez by holding that the
legislature's authorization of an interlocutory appeal in these circum-
stances does not imply that the legislature required an interlocutory ap-
peal."i' The supreme court reversed and remanded to the court of
appeals for a determination of Hernandez's claim on the merits. 112 Chief
Justice Jefferson dissented and argued that the purpose of an interlocu-
tory appeal in this situation is "to quickly dispense with frivolous health
care litigation.I" 3 Thus, if the defendant can wait to challenge the expert
report until after final judgment (rather than filing an interlocutory ap-
peal after an unsuccessful challenge of the expert report), this "injects an
element of uncertainty into the case and risks turning this screening
mechanism into a trump card."1 1 4 Thus, Chief Justice Jefferson would
hold that a defendant's failure to take an interlocutory appeal after an
unsuccessful challenge of a plaintiff's expert report waives the defen-
dant's right to appeal the adequacy of the report.115
In Badiga v. Lopez," 6 another expert-report case, the Texas Supreme
Court held that a health care provider may make an interlocutory appeal
when a plaintiff has failed to file an expert report and the trial court both
denies the health care provider's motion to dismiss and grants the plain-
tiff a thirty-day extension to file the report.117 Plaintiff Maricruz Lopez
filed a health care liability claim against Dr. Murthy Badiga after a colo-
noscopy.118 The Civil Practice and Remedies Code requires plaintiffs to
file an expert report within 120 days after commencing a health care lia-
bility suit, but Lopez filed none.119 Dr. Badiga filed a motion to dismiss,
and a month later, Lopez moved for more time to file an expert report.120
The trial court granted the extension and did not rule on Dr. Badiga's
109. Id. The supreme court reversed the court of appeals on the mootness issue. The
court of appeals had relied on two of its own previous decisions in which it found the
providers' appeal to have been moot after the trial court's dismissal of the claims against
them. Both cases, however, were reversed by the supreme court after the court of appeals
decision in the instant case. See id.
110. Id. at 318.
111. Id. at 319.
112. Id. at 321-22.
113. Id. at 331-32.
114. Id. at 331.
115. Id. at 331-32.
116. 274 S.W.3d 681 (Tex. 2009).
117. Id. at 682.
118. Id.
119. Id.; See TEX. CIV. PRAC. & REM. CODE ANN. § 74.351(a) (Vernon 2005 & Supp.
2009).
120. Badiga, 274 S.W.3d at 682.
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motion to dismiss. 121 Lopez filed an expert report within the extended
time, and Dr. Badiga filed a second motion to dismiss which incorporated
his first motion and challenged the adequacy of the report.122 The trial
court denied the motion to dismiss, and Dr. Badiga filed an interlocutory
appeal.123 Holding that the appeal pertained to the thirty-day extension,
which was not appealable, the court of appeals dismissed the interlocu-
tory appeal for want of jurisdiction.124
Texas Civil Practice and Remedies Code section 74.351(b) prescribes
that if the required expert report is not timely filed, the court shall award
the physician attorney's fees and costs and dismiss the claim with
prejudice. 125 Section 74.351(c) permits the trial court to grant a thirty-
day extension to allow the plaintiff to cure a report found to be defi-
cient.126 Interlocutory appeal is permitted by section 51.014(a)(9) from
an order that denies relief under section 74.351(b), except there is no
interlocutory appeal from an order granting an extension.127 Thus, the
Texas Supreme Court noted the distinction: "[I]nterlocutory appeal is
permitted for the denial of a motion to dismiss but not for the grant of an
extension to cure a deficient report."' 28
Badiga presented the supreme court with a question of first impression:
whether an interlocutory appeal of a denial of a doctor's motion to dis-
miss is permitted when the trial court grants an extension not merely to
cure the deficiencies in a filed report but to file a report in the first in-
stance.129 The supreme court considered the policy behind allowing an
interlocutory appeal in these circumstances, and it concluded that inter-
locutory appeals should be permitted when the plaintiff has utterly failed
to file any report, as opposed to filing a timely but inadequate report. 30
In the supreme court's view, this result is a corollary of the legislative
policy that forbids the trial court from denying the defendant's motion to
dismiss or granting the plaintiff an extension to file when the plaintiff has
missed the 120-day deadline for filing an expert report, which the su-
preme court likened to a statute of limitations. 13' Dr. Badiga properly
appealed the denial of his motion to dismiss, which should be considered
on the merits separate and apart from the granting of an extension.132
The supreme court thus reversed and remanded for the court of appeals





125. Id. at 683; TEX. CIv. PRAC. & REM. CODE ANN. § 74.351(b) (Vernon 2010 & Supp.
2010).
126. Badiga, 274 S.W.3d. at 683; TEX. CIV. PRAC. & REM. CODE ANN. § 74.351(c).
127. Badiga, 274 S.W.3d. at 683; TEX. Civ. PRAC. & REM. CODE ANN. §§ 51.014(a)(9)
(Vernon 2008), 74.531(b) (Vernon 2005 & Supp. 2009).
128. Badiga, 274 S.W.3d. at 683.
129. Id.
130. Id. at 684.
131. Id. at 683.




V. INDIGENT HEALTH CARE
A. HoSPITAL DisTRicT IMMUNITY
In Harris County Hospital District v. Tomball Regional Hospital,134 the
Texas Supreme Court held that county hospital districts are immune from
suits to recover medical expenses for services rendered to indigent pa-
tients pursuant to the Indigent Health Care and Treatment Act. 35
The Tomball Hospital Authority (THA) operates Tomball Regional
Hospital (the Hospital).136 The Hospital rendered medical services to in-
digent Harris County residents under the Indigent Health Care and
Treatment Act and sought reimbursement from the Harris County Hospi-
tal District (the District) pursuant to the Act.'37 The District refused to
pay, and THA sued.'38 In response, the District made a plea to the juris-
diction, asserting governmental immunity from suit. 13 9 The trial court
granted the plea and dismissed the case, but the court of appeals deter-
mined that section 281.056 of the Health and Safety Code, which provides
that hospital district boards may "sue and be sued," waives the District's
immunity.140 The Texas Supreme Court reversed.
The supreme court first noted the general rule that hospital districts
have governmental immunity that may be waived only by "clear and un-
ambiguous language."141 Though section 281.056 allows hospital district
boards to "be sued," the supreme court determined that "the Legislature
intended to invest districts with powers and authority necessary to con-
duct their business."142 There is, however, no indication that by use of
the 'sue and be sued' language the Legislature clearly intended to waive
hospital districts' immunity from suit."143
THA argued that article 9, section 4, of the Texas constitution waives
the District's immunity from suit when it requires the District to "assume
full responsibility for providing medical and hospital care to needy inhab-
itants of the county." 1 " However, the supreme court held that the con-
stitution merely imposes liability on the District; it does not detail how
the hospital's liability may be enforced (for example, by suit).14 5
Finally, the supreme court examined other statutory provisions, like the
Indigent Health Care and Treatment Act, and found no clear waiver of
133. Id.
134. 283 S.W.3d 838, 841 (Tex. 2009).
135. TEX. HEALTH & SAFETY CODE ANN. §§ 61.001-.011 (Vernon 2010).




140. Id.; See TEX. HEALTH & SAFETY CODE ANN. § 281.056(a) (Vernon 2010).
141. Harris County Hosp. Dist., 283 S.W.3d at 842.
142. Id. at 843.
143. Id.
144. TEX. CONST. art. IX, § 4; Harris County Hosp. Dist., 283 S.W.3d at 843.
145. Harris County Hosp. Dist., 283 S.W.3d at 844.
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governmental immunity.146 Thus, the supreme court reversed and dis-
missed the case.147 Chief Justice Jefferson dissented, arguing that the
Texas constitution provided for District liability for the costs of indigent
health care provided by others and that the liability must be enforced in
some way.14 8 Chief Justice Jefferson concluded that the governmental
immunity waiver should extend only to monetary damages; THA should
be able to seek injunctive relief from the District under the Texas
constitution.1 4 9
It is unclear whether House Bill 2963, effective September 1, 2009,
would change the outcome in cases such as this one. The law amended
Health and Safety Code section 61.0045(b) to clarify that if the patient to
whom services are provided is an eligible county resident, the county,
hospital district, or public hospital must pay the health care provider's
claim to the extent of liability under section 61.033 or section 61.060.150
B. INDIGENT HEALTH CARE AND UNDERSERVED AREAS
Senate Bill 1705, effective September 1, 2009, added section 281.0282
to the Health and Safety Code to authorize the board of the Dallas
County Hospital District (the District) to hire physicians, dentists, and
other health care providers in order to meet its indigent-care responsibili-
ties through its community-oriented primary care clinics.' The law pro-
vides an exception to the state's prohibition against the corporate
practice of medicine, which would otherwise prevent the District from
employing the health care professionals. The board may employ health
care providers for a maximum term of four years "as the board considers
necessary for the efficient operation of the district."1 52 This power ex-
tends only to the extent necessary to fulfill the District's requirement to
provide health care for indigent residents.153 However, consistent with
the philosophy behind the corporate-practice doctrine, section 281.0282
specifically does not authorize the board to supervise or control the prac-
tice of medicine. 154 Section 281.0282 requires the District to create a
committee of at least five practicing physicians to approve policies and
"ensure that a physician who is employed by the district is exercising the
physician's independent medical judgment in providing care to
patients."155
146. Id. at 844-46.
147. Id. at 849.
148. Id. at 849-50 (Jefferson, J., dissenting).
149. Id. at 850-52.
150. Tex. H.B. 2963, 81st Leg., R.S. (2009). Also, sections 61.029(c) and 61.059(d) are
amended to provide that a county, public hospital, or hospital district may provide eligible
residents health care by purchasing health coverage or other benefits. Id.







Senate Bill 202, effective September 1, 2009, adds section 155.101 to
the Texas Occupations Code and provides a provisional license to prac-
tice medicine in certain underserved areas.' 56 Under this section, the
board must grant a provisional license to a physician in good standing in
another state so that the physician can practice medicine in an under-
served area.157 Among other requirements, the physician must be spon-
sored by a licensed physician unless it would pose a hardship to the
applying physician.158 An underserved area is an area that has been des-
ignated by the federal government as a health-professional shortage area
or by the federal or state government as a medically underserved area. 159
A provisional license expires upon the earlier of the issuance or denial of
a license or the 270th day after the issuance of the provisional license. 160
VI. FACILITY REGULATION
A. INFECTION REPORTING
Senate Bill 203, effective September 1, 2009, amends Health and Safety
Code section 98.103(a), (b) and (c).1 6 1 Under the amended section, a
health care facility or a pediatric and adolescent hospital must report not
only the incidence of surgical site infections but also the causative patho-
gen. 162 The law also amends chapter 98 of the Health and Safety Code to
expand the scope of the Advisory Panel on Health Care-Associated In-
fections to include "preventable adverse events." The amendment cre-
ates a reporting requirement for preventable adverse events by each
health care facility to the Department of State Health Services.163 Events
that must be reported include: (1) a health care-associated adverse condi-
tion not covered by Medicare and (2) an event from the list of adverse
events of the National Quality Forum. 164 Further, section 98.109 is
amended to protect state employees and officers from being questioned
in civil, criminal, or other proceedings about the existence or contents of
the information concerning health-care-associated infections and pre-
ventable adverse events. 165 Finally, section 32.0312 as amended provides
that the Texas Health and Human Services executive commissioner shall
adopt rules to provide for the denial or reduction of reimbursement of
medical assistance for preventable adverse events, and that the commis-
sioner must ensure similarity with federal policies for Medicare and
Medicaid. 166













B. PAIN MANAGEMENT CLINICS
Senate Bill 911, effective September 1, 2009, amends Occupations
Code chapter 167, which regulates pain management clinics. Section
167.001 defines a pain management clinic as "a publicly or privately
owned facility for which a majority of patients are issued on a monthly
basis a prescription for opiods, benzodiazepines, barbiturates, or
carisoprodol, but not including suboxone." 167 Section 167.002 lists facili-
ties to which chapter 167 does not apply, including medical or dental
schools, hospitals, and state-operated facilities. 168 Inspections of pain
management clinics are authorized by section 167.052, and complaints re-
garding pain management clinics are investigated pursuant to section
167.053.169 Pain management clinics must be certified by the Texas Medi-
cal Board under chapter 167, while applications for certificates and the
issuance and renewal of those certificates are regulated by sections
167.102 and 167.151.170 To be certified, a pain management clinic must be
operated and owned by a medical director who is a physician practicing in
Texas under an unrestricted license.17'
VII. TELEMEDICINE
Under the Administrative Code, telemedicine is the "practice of health
care delivery . .. by a provider who is located at a site other than the site
where the patient is located, for the purposes of evaluation, diagnosis,
consultation, or treatment that requires the use of advanced telecommu-
nications technology." 1 7 2 To comply with Senate Bills 24 and 760, the
THHSC made several changes to the Medicaid telemedicine program. 73
Sections 354.1430 (definitions), 354.1432 (benefits and limitations), and
354.1434 (requirements for telemedicine providers) were repealed, and
new sections 354.1530 (definitions) and 354.1432 (benefits and limita-
tions) were adopted.174 The new section 354.1430 removes limitations on
the location of the distant site, 175 expands the professionals who may be
patient site presenters,176 and incorporates the federal definition of "un-





172. 1 TEXAS ADMIN. CODE § 354.1430(1) (2010).
173. 34 Tex. Reg. 3253 (2009) (to be codified at 1 TEX. ADMIN. CODE §§ 354.1430,
354.1432); see also 1 TEX. ADMIN. CODE §§ 354.1430, 354.1432, 354.1434.
174. 34 Tex. Reg. 3253 (2009) (to be codified at 1 TEX. ADMIN. CODE §§ 354.1430,
354.1432).
175. 1 TEX. ADMIN. CODE § 354.1430 (2010) ("The distant site location is where the
distant site provider is physically located.").
176. Id. § 354.1430(4)(A) ("The patient site presenter must be: Licensed or certified in
this state to perform health care services and must present and/or be delegated tasks and
activities only within the scope of the individual's licensure or certification.").
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derserved area."' 7 7 As to the services rendered via telemedicine, new
section 354.1432 clarifies that consultations, office or outpatient visits,
psychiatric diagnostic interviews, pharmacologic management, and psy-
chotherapy provided via telemedicine are Medicaid-reimbursable if they
are provided through "'face-to-face' interactive video communications
with the client."178
In the same vein, the Texas Medical Board proposed amendments to 22
Texas Administrative Code sections 174.1, 174.2, and 174.6, as well as the
addition of sections 174.7 and 174.8, concerning telemedicine, at the end
of the Survey period.179 The amendments exempt special purpose
telemedicine licenses for doctors who practice outside Texas' 80 and de-
fine "distant-site physician," "patient-site location," and "patient-site pre-
senter" according to the THHSC definitions in 1 Texas Administrative
Code section 354.1430.181 With regard to the two newly proposed regula-
tions, 22 Texas Administrative Code section 174.7 requires that both the
distant-site physician and the patient-site presenter maintain medical
records of the telemedicine services.182 22 Texas Administrative Code
section 174.8 incorporates repealed section 174.4 language regarding the
use of the Internet in medical practice and clarifies that "out-of-state phy-
sician[s] may provide episodic consultations" without Texas licensure.183
On November 27, 2009, the Board withdrew these proposed amendments
and repeals.184
On May 14, 2009, the THHSC adopted the repeal and replacement of 1
Texas Administrative Code section 355.7001, which addresses
telemedicine services reimbursement.185 These changes are again in ac-
cordance with Senate Bills 24 and 760, and the purpose of the changes is
to align the reimbursement provisions of section 354.1430 and following
with section 355.7001 for reimbursement rates.186 The new section
355.7001 incorporates the same program policies as the changes to section
354.1430 and following, and section 355.7001(b) provides that patient
sites will be reimbursed a facility fee instead of a professional fee.187
177. Id. § 354.1430(9) ("An underserved area is an area that meets the current defini-
tion of a medically underserved area or medically underserved population (MUP) by the
U.S. Department of Health and Human Services (DHHS).").
178. Id. § 354.1432.
179. 34 Tex. Reg. 6773 (2009) (to be codified at 22 TEX. ADMIN. CODE §H 174.1-.8)
(proposed Sept. 21, 2009).
180. Id.
181. Id.; see also 1 TEX. ADMIN. CODE § 354.1430 (2009).
182. 34 Tex. Reg. 6773 (2009) (to be codified at 22 TEX. ADMIN. CODE § 174).
183. Id.
184. 34 Tex. Reg. 8481 (2009).
185. 34 Tex. Reg. 2765 (2009) (to be codified at 1 TEX. ADMIN. CODE § 355.7001).
186. 34 Tex. Reg. 13 (2009) (to be codified at 1 TEX. ADMIN. CODE § 355.7001).




Every two years the legislature spends six months considering hun-
dreds upon hundreds of bills dealing with public health, health care prov-
iders of every type, patient issues, and taxation and liability rules that
shape the delivery of health care services within the state of Texas. As
this past Survey year illustrates, we are increasingly challenged to develop
statutory responses to keep up with technological, medical, and political
developments. Telemedicine, to take but one example from this past
year, is a fast-moving field in which business practices change faster than
many full-time legislatures can respond.
With the passage of a sweeping federal health care reform law in 2010,
and the promulgation of well over 1,000 implementing regulations over
the next four years, the need for speed as well as thoughtful deliberation
will pose major challenges to state law-makers. Our new telemedicine
rules illustrate an approach to developing timely responses to changes in
federal law. Broad statutory delegations to state agencies that will then
have the authority to develop regulatory responses to changes coming out
of Washington may be our best hope for dealing with an increasingly
complex health-law regime.
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